No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

MEMORAN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DOS REVIEWED 12-Nov-2010: UNCLASSIFIED

NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

REFER TO DOS

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
31 State Department/White House Summer Interns (list attached)

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, August 11, 1971 - 5:15 p.m.

PLACE: NSC Conference Room (Room 305 EOB)

Dr. Kissinger: I was introduced as being on leave from Harvard; actually I have resigned. I have also been threatened with excommunication.

You have heard bureaucrats tell you that their policy is the best of all possible policies. I won't bore you with the same line. Why don't we go directly to your questions?

Question (Intern from University of Pennsylvania): Why does the U.S. insist that a Berlin agreement has to precede a European Security Conference?

Dr. Kissinger: Actually, that is not so much the U.S. position as the West German position. First, we should get clear what a European Security Conference is; it is a fashionable phrase but no one knows what it means. The Russians have excluded force reductions, Berlin, and any other German issue from the agenda. What is left? Trade, cultural exchange, etc. But there are other ways to get these. Our attitude is neither wildly for nor against. The Germans fear that the Russians will gain the atmosphere but without settling any concrete issue.

This question is academic now, because there is a strong possibility that Berlin will be settled in the next month.

Now, MBFR has never been linked to Berlin. We are ready to talk on MBFR as soon as the allies in the Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting in October develop a common position. The U.S. is ready now, but it is an alliance problem and we need an agreed allied position. We have proceeded as in SALT. (In 1969, some thought talks were good in themselves, but we didn't want to talk before we knew what the subject was. The SALT talks

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

have seemed relatively slow, but in fact they have gone faster than previous talks on less complex arms control topics.) We are using the building blocks method, and much of the work is now done.

Question: Did the President foresee an improvement in U.S.-Chinese relations at the time of the ping-pong breakthrough?

Dr. Kissinger: No one in my position will ever admit that it wasn't all planned!

Actually, our relations with China developed in two phases. First, it has been our deliberate policy since February 1, 1969, to try to open up unofficial channels to the Chinese (channels not through the regular bureaucracy. The President sent me a note on that date with the instruction to do this. Secondly, we established the regular policy of lifting trade and other restrictions, which we did almost every three months, and doing other things like calling them by their proper name, the People's Republic of China.

After a long while, we began to hear back from them. The only surprise in the ping-pong development was the ping-pong aspect of it. We had been sure since last fall that they would soon open up to some degree. In retrospect, it was clever of them to choose a totally irrelevant way to do it, like a ping-pong tournament, it was a dramatic development, and they had a lot of fuss made over them. But at the time of the ping-pong development, the negotiations that led to my July visit were already in train.

What will happen in the future? We will have to set a date for the trip, and continue exchanging ideas. We can perhaps expect a slow improvement in our relations. At least if we can survive American journalists. Read the Reston interview: It's hard to tell which one was the American!. Chou says the President has courage, and Reston says no!

Question (Dartmouth): Does the Soviet-Indian treaty alter the situation in a constructive way or not?

Dr. Kissinger: There are three different problems in the situation in the Subcontinent. The first is the incipient famine in East Pakistan. The second is the flood of refugees from East Pakistan into India. The third is the problem of a political accommodation within Pakistan.

There is no dispute over the first. As the Secretary of State made clear at the UN, as soon as the UN takes formal charge we will send a team out there. The problem here is the physical one of distribution.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

The other issue is the relationship between the second and the third problems. This has two aspects. One is the refugees in West Bengal (India). Here the Indians have a genuine concern. The U.S. has provided more aid than the rest of the world, so we have no reason to be excessively apologetic. But the Indians also have to make up their mind what they want -- to settle the refugee problem, or to keep the pot boiling until Pakistan falls apart. We sympathize with them on the first but not on the second. The problem is the danger of war. The last thing we (and they) need is an international war.

What are the Soviets doing? I sometimes have the impression -- whatever you may think of our government -- that their leadership has a habit of letting the short-term tactical aims get ahead of their long-term interests. They may be tempted to seek heady gains. The famine problem is short-term; the political accommodation will take a year, or longer. But the danger of war is now.

What happens depends on what advice the Soviets give India.

Question: What is the extent of their treaty?

Dr. Kissinger: It provides for formal consultations. I don't think the Soviets will run major risks. The danger isn't the formal arrangement but whether India misinterprets the freedom of action the treaty gives them.

Question: (W. Va. -- diplomatic history student): Years ago when you wrote scholarly articles you wrote about the problem of the expansion of bureaucracies, their intellectual inertia, and their tendency to develop a life of their own and to become self-serving in their policy making. How do you feel now?

Dr. Kissinger: I feel essentially the same now. (Laughter) My own "bureaucracy" is rather small; it has only about 45 professionals covering everything important going on in State, Defense, CIA, and the foreign activities of all the other agencies. It's not too much of a bureaucracy. I keep them in a state of exhaustion. I have one staffer who resigns every three weeks. When the day comes that I resign, he'll come in again and say: "Now that you've done this to me, I resign!" (Laughter)

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

As for the other bureaucracies taking on a life of their own, I'll stand by what I wrote. I have to devote an extraordinary amount of my time to management of the bureaucracy, instead of to reasoning on abstract issues. My academic friends who write learned pieces about our actions show great virtuousity in seeing reasoning behind our actions!

This problem is one of the curses of the modern state. I don't mean just the U.S.; it must be at least as bad, if not far worse, in the USSR. I have found that the only way to get things done is to take issues out of the bureaucracy for handling, and then to put them back in the bureaucracy when they are on track.

For bureaucrats, the relative prestige of their office is of enormous importance. For example, in the NSC system there are two committees, the Senior Review Group and the Under Secretaries Committee, whose membership is virtually the same. But the chairman is different. Meetings of the USC are much larger. I keep the SRG meetings small. I keep the attendance down. I don't care who dislikes me. I won't be here forever. But the Chairman of the USC has to invite a representative of any agency that has even a vague interest in a subject. He has to do this in order to insure that State will be invited to participate in meetings in which it has a slight interest.

A second difference in practice is that I'm not here to try to win a popularity contest. My job is to sharpen disagreement, and then to take the contentious issues to the President. But the departments don't want to overrule each other or be overruled by each other. They have a continuing relationship to protect, that outlasts individual issues and even individual administrations. Therefore the tendency in their papers and proceedings is to fuzz over their disagreements. If I had their responsibility I'd do what they do. But I work only for the President, and this gives me advantages.

In my personal view, if I were in charge of a bureaucracy I'd let 98% of the people go along doing their work, and I'd do the really important work with a tiny group and work them to death.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

Question: Some analysts like Jeffrey Hart and Alsop and Buckley are saying that the US is entering a period in which it will no longer be the world's dominant power. Is this true? Also, Nixon said in 1968 that the US should not recognize Red China. What has changed since then?

Dr. Kissinger: Let me say something about our moves toward China. There are no military constraints in our relationship to China; the US is so obviously superior militarily that it goes without saying. The idea that US contact with China changes the military situation vis-à-vis the USSR is another misconception. For one thing, the Soviet reaction to any military collusion would be justifiably violent. Secondly, China's usable military power doesn't really complement ours. Thirdly, we and China will be opponents for a long time. Our aim in this contact really is to manage our rivalry. Their leaders didn't fight 50 years, go on the Long March, take on both us and the Soviets, and tear themselves apart for doctrinal purity in order to settle into a comfortable middle-class existence. They are dedicated men. We have no illusions.

I don't know what the President meant in 1968; I was supporting his chief rival. Since I've known him we've agreed: There can be no stable peace in Asia with these 800 million people not participating in it or [redacted] hostile to it. We're not thinking about just the next year or two. I found that Chou is thinking in the same terms.

As for the military situation vis-à-vis the USSR: the US has just barely stopped being an adolescent in foreign policy. First we enjoyed total immunity, then we had vast superiority, such as no other country ever had. Now we have a new situation.

The Soviets have more missiles than we do; we have more warheads. They have greater megatonnage, we have greater accuracy. I have yet to see a plausible description of what either side can usably do with these weapons. In 1962 the USSR had fewer than 70 ICBM's, which were above-ground, totally vulnerable, and took 10 hours to prepare for launching. Today they have 1400, in silos, that can be fired quickly. But we wouldn't have superiority if we had five times what they have. The numbers are so large. Casualties would be in the millions anyway. Nobody has ever even test-fired as many as 200 simultaneously. The older concepts of military power are no longer relevant. The precepts of the 1950's -- massive retaliation, attrition of the opponent -- couldn't be applied.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

It is not true that the Soviets can knock out our forces or impose political objectives on us. But local power balances are now more important, and our military power can affect that.

Strategic weapons are roughly in balance now.

Question: How flexible are we in regard to Taiwan, in trying to manage our rivalry with Peking?

Dr. Kissinger: Chou En-lai seems to feel he has more time to deal with this issue than Reston has! Reston seems to feel it has to be settled now. Chou saw it as part of an historical process. Now, no country can ask us to do dishonorable things. Our publicists are great at disposing of allies. For us to shift from one day to the next from recognizing them to throwing them to the wolves would obviously affect other countries' respect for us -- and even the respect the PRC would have for us. Both sides are mature countries and are willing to leave some things to historical evolution.

Question: Why is the visit set for so long after the announcement?

Dr. Kissinger: Not for the Taiwan issue. These are two countries who have had no contact for 22 years. There is much underbrush to clear away, so that the heads of government can have some framework. We have to discuss some things in a preliminary way first. Secondly, we need a decent interval for our respective allies to get used to it, so that the actual meeting itself will be a stabilizing influence. Thirdly, there is the matter of the President's schedule. An October date would be very fast; arrangements for such a trip take a long time, even for the technical aspects.

Question: Japan is obviously affected by this. What will her policy be now?

Dr. Kissinger: You have to remember, first of all, that serious countries don't make policy out of personal irritation. There are a number of factors bearing on our relationship. Japan has long been an economic giant but without a political role. They in effect turned over responsibility for foreign policy and defense to us. Sooner or later they had to come of

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

age politically. We threw them in the water to make them learn to swim. We would have preferred a gentler way, but we had no alternative course in this situation. The Republic of China had first claim for advance notice of the announcement, but they also would have had a vested interest in blocking it. Sato would have needed, not private knowledge of the announcement, but the opportunity to position himself in advance. We couldn't risk it in either case. This was a price we had to pay.

Question: The US has been charged with committing war crimes under the 1925 Geneva Protocol and also with the forcible relocation of civilians. Was this a wise action? Also, were you involved at all in the strategic hamlet program while you were at the Harvard Center?

Dr. Kissinger: In other words, am I a war criminal? I know of no Harvard connection with the strategic hamlet program. On herbicides, we are ending their use this year. I keep in close touch on this issue with Matt Meselson, who is a responsible critic of the use of these weapons. Use of herbicides is now confined to a narrow perimeter around firebases.

Question: The new direction of the Nixon Doctrine is to stress regional cooperation and the use of indigenous organizations. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN, SEATO, and ASPAC are not effective military organizations. Will we develop an offshore alliance system for mainland Asian military involvement? What will the President's Peking trip do to this?

Dr. Kissinger: Formal alliances are not the key. Our interests create our commitments, not the other way around. The countries and regions concerned have the primary responsibility. We come in (a) when it is in our interest, and (b) when we can make a difference.

We can't determine how things will develop. Japan's role, for example, is not determined by us.

There are two approaches to security, the purely military and a mixture of military and political (e.g. negotiation). There has to be some military element, because if there is no power balance there are no restraints.

Question: What policy should we adopt toward Japan on our trade problems?

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

Dr. Kissinger: On economic questions I am a living argument against universal suffrage. (Laughter) Economics bores me. I also see that economists don't know the answers either. Japan's evolution is not an economic problem. At the moment, they have no incentive for voluntary restraint. If Japan continues to build a co-prosperity sphere in Asia under the umbrella of U.S. protection and uses its foreign aid to build exclusive markets for its exports, this is bound to become destabilizing. If our China step forces Japan to ask where it's going, it may be a healthy thing.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

MEMORAN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

11 August 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Peter Rodman PR

SUBJECT: Your Meeting This Afternoon with State Dept. / White House Interns

You are scheduled to meet today with a group of 31 State Department and 14 White House summer interns, at 5:00 p.m. in the NSC Conference Room (Room 305, E.O.B.). They are a mixture of undergraduates, graduate students, and law students.

Talking points on General Philosophy are at Tab A, though I expect a Q. &A. session is what it will end up as.

A roster of the White House interns is at Tab B.

A roster of the State interns is at Tab C.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

WHITE HOUSE INTERNS

Robert A. Buchanan	Dent's staff
Chris Chapin	Malek's staff
Tom Davis	Dent's staff
Arthur Fergenson	Dean's staff
Marshal Gilman	Nesbitt's staff
Scott Gleason	Klein's staff
Doug Hallett	Colson's staff
Harding Jones	Finch's staff
Jeanne Luboja	Stuart's staff
Loretta Lungren	Buchanan's staff
Dolly Madison	Farrell's staff
Chris Marshall	Finch's staff
Mel Stevens	Colson's staff
Robert Sutcliffe	Kingsley's staff

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

STATE DEPARTMENT INTERNS

Blake, Vaughn	BA Univ. of Redlands, SAIS Johns Hopkins
Burch, Candace	BA Bradley Univ., entering Howard
Clarke, Richard A.	Univ. of Penn.
Ford, A. Sue	Univ. of Virginia
Gadsden, James I.	BA Harvard Univ., currently Stanfo
Hauge, John R.	Dartmouth College
Handal, Marie Louise	BA Hunter College, currently Geor town Univ.
Jeter, Howard F.	BA Morehouse College, SAIS Johns Hopkins
Kang, Agnes T.	BA Univ. of Calif., Berkeley; currently Univ. of Calif., Berkeley
Kasting, Kent M.	BS Univ. of Utah, currently Law Sch Univ. of Utah
Knickrehm, Steven C.	Virginia Polytechnic Institute
Lubeley, Jan	Univ. of Dayton
Mayfield, Mary D.	BA Virginia State College, entering Univ. of Virginia
McConnell, Daphne R.	BA Univ. of Michigan, currently Uni of Michigan
Nakamura, Reid A.	Univ. of Calif., Berkeley
Rose, Robert N.	Georgetown Univ.
Stuart, Robert W.	BS U.S. Naval Academy
Walsh, Richard	BS U.S. Naval Academy
Taylor, Dierdre C.	BA Geo. Washington Univ.; currently Law School, Geo. Washington Univ.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0

Yee, Gerald W.	BA Univ. of Calif., Berkeley; curren Law Sch., Univ. of Calif., Berk
Corbett, John F.	U.S. Military Academy
Jordan, Keith	Dartmouth College

The following are all from the Legal Advisor's office at State:

Anderson, William A.

Dahl, William A.

Evans, Jane A.

Poplin, Caroline M.

Unger, Rosa Lee

Weidner, Phillip P.

Wetherington, Donald L.

Zamora, Stephen T.

Strachan, Kristine

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-269-10-11-0